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Morality and Pretextuality,
Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense,"
~euristicReasoning, and
Cognitive Dissonance
Michael L. Perlin
The thesis of this paper is that we will not make significant progress in understanding the tensions between the legal and mental health systems until we look
carefully at a series of dissonances that affect both systems. We must consider the
way that the law frequently condones pretextuality as a way of dealing with troubling
or cognitively dissonant information, and the way that mental health professionals
encourage a self-referential concept of morality as a way of subverting legal
doctrines with which they disagree. These dissonances must be considered contextually in connection with the ways that courts generally read social science data
and the ways that jurors and legislators employ such cognitive devices as "ordinary
common sense" and heuristic reasoning in their judgments of cases involving mental
disability questions. To ameliorate the current dilemma, we must redefine institutional and professional roles, reconsider the way we privilege expertise, recalibrate
our allocation of "moral jurisdiction" over these matters, and consciously confront
the way our simplifying thinking mechanisms distort the underlying social and
political issues.

The law prides itself on its fairness and
its inherent sense of rationality.' The
This paper is adapted from a luncheon presentation at
the annual meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, San Diego, California, October 1990.
Earlier versions of portions were presented at the Clarke
Institute of Psychiatry and METFORS, June 1990,
Toronto. ON, Canada, and at a University of San Diego
Law School Faculty workshop, October 1990. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Debbie Dorfman for her research assistance, to Drs. Robert L. Sadoff
and Richard Rogers, Prof. Richard Sherwin, and the
participants at both the University of San Diego Law
School workshop and the Clarke Institute presentation
for their many helpful suggestions, and to Linda Perlin,
M.S.W., for helping me understand so many of the
underlying therapeutic issues. Address correspondence
to Prof. Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School. 57
Worth St., New York, NY 10013.
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legal trial process presupposes an ascertainable "truth" as a basis for testimony,' and severe sanctions are imposed for the commission of p e r j ~ r y . ~
Psychiatry and psychology, in turn, reject notions of a unitary concept of "reason," pointing out that the range of human behavior is infinite, and that unconscious variables and processes,
conflicts, anxieties and defenses-the irrational-are
frequently the primary
causes of b e h a ~ i o r The
. ~ mental health
professions also counsel practitioners
not to impose their sense of "morality"
131
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on patients or clients5 nor to employ
their authority as a defense in dealing
with such client^.^
At the point that these two systems
intersect, something strange happens.
Perhaps because of the "substantial gulf
between scientific and legal discourse,"'
perhaps because of the different training
received by mental health professionals
(MHPs) and lawyer^,^ perhaps because
of the public's radically differing perceptions of the substance of law and the
mental health profession^,^ those who
are involved in both professional arenas
must consider the way that these internal
and inherent differences create tensions
that have a measurable effect on what
happens when these cultures collide, especially in the forensic mental disability
system.
I propose to look at this collision from
several vantage points that, to the best
of my knowledge, have not been seriously explored: from the perspectives of
the way that law-the system extolling
"truth" as a highest virtue-adopts pretextuality as a means of dealing with
information or situations that it finds
troubling or dissonant, and the way that
the mental health professions-the systems that counsel against attributions of
"morality" in interpersonal dealingsimpose a self-referential concept of morality in dealing with legal interactions.
I will argue that, if we are to understand
why the historic relationshiplo between
the law and the mental health professions is seen as a rocky one, characterized variously as an uneasy detente, a
shotgun marriage, or a marriage de
convenunce," it is necessary to consider
132

the question through these two filters of
pretextuality and morality.
Let me suggest several overlapping
premises. First. much of what lawyers
say about forensic testimony is pretextual.I2 Second, much of what forensic
mental health professionals who frequently wear the hat of expert witness
say about individual cases is similarly
pretextual, ostensibly for reasons of
" m ~ r a l i t y . " 'Third,
~
much of the way
judges interpret forensic testimony is teleological.14 Fourth, much of the way
that jurors feel about all of this is highlighted by overwhelming ambivalence.I5
Fifth, much of what legislators try to do
in this area appears to be overwhelmingly futile.16 Sixth, very few of the rest
of the public cares very much about all
of this almost all of the time, but do care
intensely about all of it in the case of the
rare "moral mistake," especially when it
involves one of the rare but dreaded
"false positives." l 7
I further propose to show that (1) little
of any of this can be coherently explained without refuge to such cognitive
psychology constructs as heuristic reasoning, psychological reactance, and
cognitive dissonance:" (2) the relationship between the mutually symbiotic
systems of law and forensic mental
health is an increasingly more fragile
one, and, as the Hinckley acquittal demonstrated, one vivid, outrageous case
can wipe out the results of years of study,
collection of empirical data, and reflective inquiry into any aspect of the mental health systemI9; and (3) most of what
is written-in both law and the mental
health professions-utterly ignores both
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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of my major premises as well as these
two proposition^.^^ My hope in writing
this paper is that both lawyers and mental health professionals will come to recognize that, even if the pursuit of
agreement2' appears to be beyond us, we
can at least acknowledge that there are
bridges to be built.

Pretextuality of Law
To label the law as pretextual might
sound a bit presumptous or nihilistic,
but I do not mean to be either." What I
am suggesting is this: there is a dramatic
tension between those areas in which
courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) dishonesty in certain subject-matter
areas and those where they erect insurmountable barriers to guard against
what they perceive as feigning, malingering, or other misuse of the legal sysSeveral varying examples should illustrate the phenomenon. Regularly, in
search and seizure suppression motion
hearings,14 courts wink at police testimony that suggests that the defendant,
after "gesturing furtively," dropped a
glassine envelope containing a powdery
substance in plain view of the officer,
and then subsequently and spontaneously blurted out, "That heroin is
mine." This testimony is clearly pretext ~ a l as
, ~are
~ statements by legislators
that their rationale for a "moment of
silence" bill had nothing to do with
school prayer, and was merely to insure
that students had time for "private contemplation and intro~pection."~~
Again,
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991

courts accept this uncritically and at face
value.
Elsewhere, studies confirm that the
mandated provision of free counsel to
indigents facing imprisonment upon
conviction is frequently subverted by
both economic and political factors well
known to, but ignored by, those responsible for such provision of counsel,"
again with little perceptible impact on
actual practice.28 In yet another sort of
example, even though the District of
Columbia Code contains a provision
that patients can invoke seeking either
periodic review of their commitment or
an independent psychiatric evaluation,
evidence developed in a recent case revealed that, in the 22 years since passage
of the relevant law, not a single patient
had exercised his rights to this statutory
review.29 Finally, a recent opinion by
Justice Scalia on the "lawyers' question"
of what weight is to be given to congressional debate in determining a statute's
meaning-in which he characterized interpretative rules that assume a common
understanding on the part of each congressperson as to the meaning of the
enacted legislation as a "benign ficti~n"~~-suggests that the Supreme
Court is, in some areas, willing to concede the pretextuality of some level of
legal decisionmaking.
An even more troubling example is
the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Keir~p,~'
rejecting the use of
statistical evidence offered to show systemic racial discrimination in Georgia
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death
penalty, and in jurors' decisions to impose the death sentence based upon the
133
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victim's race.32Following McCleskey, in
order to prevail, the defendant must
show "that the decisionmakers in his
case acted with discriminatory purpose,"33a standard that, presumably, intelligent Georgia prosecutors will be able
to avoid.
Contrast this acceptance of pretextuality, on the other hand, with the
court's well-documented "fear of faking" in response to any argument seeking expanded admissibility of testimony
as to mental disability in a variety of
criminal procedure settings,34 as evidenced in Chief Justice Rehnquist's regular invocation of "parade of horrors"
arguments in such cases.35Similarly consider courts' "ordinary common sensical" (OCS) beliefs36 in popular myths
that have arisen as to such issues as "the
litigation e~plosion,"'~the frequent use
of exaggerated testimony in personal injury c a s e ~ or
, ~ ~the insubstantiality of
most prisoner pro se writs.39 The fact
that former Attorney General William
French Smith could tell Congress that
the insanity defense "allows so many
persons to commit crimes of violence"40
at the same time as one of his top aides
candidly conceded that the number of
such cases "is really probably statistically
insignificantn4'speaks for itself.42
This paradox reflects two deeper issues: the cognitive dissonance43 that is
caused when legal decisions violate social norms, and our refusal to acknowledge the extent of this dissonance.
Courts apparently allow (perhaps encourage) pretextuality so as to mediate
the (perceived) draconian impact of imposed-from-above constitutional deci134

sions (or, in the case of the U.S. Supreme
Court, decisions such as Miranda v.
Arizona44 or Mapp v. Ohio45 that it is
institutionally unwilling to overrule),46
at the same time that they fantasize
about feared pretextuality in cases where
anecdotal myths prevail or where unconscious values predominant.
This tension should help to explain
some of the discomfort courts feel with
forensic testimony in mental health
cases (both civil and criminal). Decisions
such as 0 'Connor v. D o n a l d ~ o n(setting
~~
out a constitutional right to liberty),
Jackson v. Indiana4* (applying the due
process clause to incompetency to stand
trial commitments) and the line of cases
following Lessard v. Schmidt49(applying
procedural due process to all aspects of
the involuntary civil commitment system) have never been popular with trial
judges or with court administrators for
a variety of instrumental, functional,
normative, and philosophical reasons.50
Notwithstanding the staggeringly unanimous data base of empirical evidence
' judges continue
to the ~ o n t r a r y , ~trial
to see the insanity defense as a wily
lawyer's ploy, in which "soft," "bleeding
heart" expert witnesses dupe gullible jurors into returning inappropriately exculpatory verdicts.52 As one result, the
legal system winks broadly at testimony
that talismanically finds "dangerousness" (based on behavior that, in reality,
shows either a need for treatment or an
ability to provide optimal care for oneself)53or that denies nonresponsibility in
criminal and civil cases where defendant's acts reflect textbook levels of mental disorder and pathology.54
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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In some instances, courts' reasoning
appears phantasmic. In one recent case,
turning on whether a defendant had the
requisite specific intent to attempt a
bank robbery, a federal district court
refused to allow a county jail psychiatrist
to testify that he had been prescribing
antipsychotic medications for the defendant for a particular purpose and for
a period of time, reasoning that such
testimony "might be interfering with the
treatment of [other] prisoners in jails
because [other] prisoners might ask for
more drugs to create the impression they
need more
Nowhere in any
opinion in the case does it appear that
there was ever any evidence introduced
that spoke remotely to this issue; yet, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision as
"not manifestly erroneous," offering no
explanation for its finding.56

"Morality" of Mental Health
Professionals
It is now necessary to consider the
specific reading of "morality" engaged
in by certain forensic mental health
professional^.^' We should begin by reflecting upon Bernard Diamond'ss8 concern that, because of a witness's unconscious identification with one "side" of
a legal battle or more conscious identification with his own value system or
ideological leanings, his "secret hope for
victory for his own opinion [may lead
to] innumerable subtle distortions and
biases in his testimony that spring from
this wish to triumph."
Research by Homant and Kennedy59
similarly seems to show that experts'
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991

opinions of insanity defense claims are
positively correlated with the witness's
underlying political ideology. Ben Bursten has argued further that any decision
as to whether behavior is a product of
mental illness is not a matter of scientific
expertise, "but a matter of social policy."60 We similarly cannot blind ourselves to the possibility that, in a whole
variety of fact-settings, social bias frequently "infects and hides behind sciOther studies seem
entific j~dgments."~'
to confirm the influence of ideology on
evaluators' assessments of civil psychic
trauma cases.62 These positions and
findings must be weighed against the
backdrop of other research that demonstrates that an overwhelming percentage
of all experienced forensic MHPs have
significantly mistaken beliefs about the
substantive insanity defense standard actually employed in their j~risdiction.~~
Thus, when involuntary civil commitment criteria were significantly tightened in the 1 9 7 0 ~ it, ~should
~
not be
surprising that some-but not
MHPs responded fairly negatively to
these developments, frequently seen as
"turf invasion^."^^ In a series of papers,
Dr. Paul Chodoff, a prominent psychiatrist, suggested that experts go along
with legal standards "as long as they
are. . .not tyranni~a1,"~'that
they neither
"acced[e] too readily to current trends"
nor "succumb to prevailing fashion
when they are convinced that it is not
always in the best interests of [their]
patients,"68 and that, in spite of legislative or judicial standards mandating a
dangerousness finding as the sine qua
non of involuntary hospitalization, a
135
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"wise and benevolent paternalism" will
lead to the "moral judgment" that they
are obligated to seek such hospitalization
for a patient "incapable of voluntarily
accepting help."69 And Dr. H. Richard
Lamb70-organized psychiatry's most
visible critic of deinstitutionalizationhas assailed courts for interpreting civil
commitment laws too "literally."
Similarly, Dr. William McCormick7'
has quoted an anonymous (but allegedly
knowledgeable) medical colleague who
reported, following the 1978 amendments to the Ontario Mental Health Act,
"Doctors will continue to certify those
whom they really believe should be certified. They will merely learn a new language.'' Although there has been some
empirical work responding to these philosophical positions and examples of anecdotal evidence,72it can in no way diminish the arguments' power.
This notion that there is a "higher
morality" to which forensic MHPs owe
is, empirisome sort of higher
cally, an extraordinarily important one,
and one that requires far greater attention on the part of all those concerned
about the underlying issues.74Although
some researchers and scholars have
taken seriously the importance of this
call in their reading of the effects of
"legislative reform" on psychiatric hospital admissions rates,75the whole question is strangely underdiscussed. Michael S a k ~ recent
' ~ ~ reference to such
witnesses as "imperial experts" who install themselves as "temporary monarch[~]''by replacing a "societal preference expressed through the law and legal
process with [their] own preferences"
136

should force us to more seriously confront the dimensions of this issue. Although the sort of arrogation to which
he refers is certainly not limited to forensic witnesses,77and it is clear that such
an attitude would not flourish if it were
not tacitly endorsed by both jurors and
l i t i g a t ~ r sit, ~is~ a problem that forensic
MHPs (and lawyers working with such
forensic experts) must carefully confront.

The Teleology of Courts
Putting aside the important question
of the dissonance of interests between
courts and MHPs (the former ostensibly
mostly focusing on community safety
and the latter on psychological functioning).79I now want to consider the basic
teleology of the courts.80Notwithstanding the careful series of proposals crafted
by Professors Monahan and Walker8' in
their attempts to create a jurisprudence
of social science, we must begin with the
givens that, first, judges are suspicious
of the psychological sciencesg2and hostile to the use of social science in the
legal processg3and, second, their track
record in this area has, generally, been
"dreadf~l."~~
Perhaps courts see social science as a
"threat,"85perhaps it is feared that social
science's "complexities. . .shake the
judge's confidence in imposed solut i o n ~ , and
" ~ ~perhaps judges' lack of clarity about the underlying issues "permits
[social science data] to be used as a kind
of deus ex machina whose sudden appearance produces the desired result."87
Thus, although the Supreme Court reBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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jected the carefully controlled "Baldus
study" (examining over 2,000 death penalty cases involving 230 statistical variables) in the McCleskey race discrimination case, it was willing, in an obscureto-the-lay-public jurisdiction case-that
turned on whether a certain manufacturer's product (a tire tube valve) was
likely to have entered the "stream of
commerce" in California-to accept uncritically a report, by an adverse party's
lawyer, as to the results of his personal
examination of the inventory of one motorcycle shop revealing that a substantial
percentage of tire tubes included valves
produced by the manufacturer in questi~n.'~
These attitudes lead to a debasement
of social science research and data (even
to the extent of suggesting that there is
something faintly supernatural or fictive
at its base), leading further to a trivialization of scientific discourse, and leading finally to the teleological use of such
data.89Scholars have thus suggested that
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court employ an outcome-determinative approach, "uncritically" accepting social
science data bolstering opinions when
they are in the majority, but "debunk[ingln it when they are in the minority. "90
The individual judging process in
mental disability cases is also, of course,
highly dependent on heuristic reasoning
proces~es.~'
The vivid and concrete case
regularly "overwhelms the abstract
data. . .upon which rational choices are
often made."9' and studies consistently
confirm that the "vividness" effect is
actively present both in judicial
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991

proceeding^^^ and, perhaps just as importantly, in our perceptions of judicial
proceeding^.^^ Thus, just as when subjects are presented with information
about one welfare recipient will they
generalize that data to all recipients,
even when told that the particular exemplar was "highly atypical of the public
at large,"95so will the judge say-either
aloud or sotto vocce-"The last time I
let one of these guys go at the release
hearing, he held up the 7-1 1 store down
the street from my brother-in-law's, and
I haven't stopped hearing about it since.
Petition denied."96
Of course, the courts are ovenvhelmingly ambivalent about expert testimony
in the first place.97On one hand, judges
frantically desire experts to testify as to
future d a n g e r o u ~ n e s s(notwithstanding
~~
the experts' plea that they frequently do
not have that expertise)" and to "take
the weight" on difficult release-or-commit de~isions.'~)"
On the other, they characterize psychiatry as "the ultimate wizardry" and psychiatrists as "medicine
m[e]n" or "shamanistic wizard^."'^'
More simply, as Alan Stonelo' has suggested, "the more they hate us, the more
they need us." When the artificially demanded "exact answer" is not available,''' especially in an area where the
ends of the law and the ends of mental
health professionals do not coincide,lo4
yet one additional layer of dissonance is
added to the system.
The Ambivalence of Juriesio5
Jurors remain overwhelmingly ambivalent about concepts of mental health,
137

Perlin

mental disability as an animating explanation for behavior (especially when the
behavior is socially deviant and/or criminal), and about the reception of expert
mental health testimony.lo6This behavior mirrors public attitudes: at the same
time that we show the need to "invest
[psychiatrists] with superior, almost supernatural powers,"'07 we remain contemptuous of mental health principles
because they appear contrary to our notions of 0CS.'08 Although courts routinely talk about the expert's mystic infallibility" or "aura of near infallibility,"lo9 it is likely that-because of the
perception that such evidence is
'~s~ft"''~-jurorsare "mildly interested"
in but not "thunderstuck" by such testimony.' ' '
What we must remember here is that
jurors, as the conscience of the community, will continue to make heuristic
judgments based on their ordinary common sensical vision of "rough j u ~ t i c e " " ~
as to who "ought to be p~nished.""~
And when the substantive law fails to
incorporate their "strong moral impuls e ~ , " " they
~
may either enter what is
called a nullification verdict'I5 (and acquit) or, what is far more likely, simply
ignore the controlling legal principles
(and convict). l 6
A recent example of the latter is illustrative. In Moore v. State,'I7 a "particularly gruesome" murder case in which
an insanity defense was raised, a juror
candidly answered voir dire questions by
stating that he thought (1) the insanity
defense was "overused," (2) that he
couldn't "let somebody off' just because
he was insane, and (3) his preexisting
138

views on the insanity defense would
"probably" prevent him from following
the court's instructions.""* Notwithstanding this candid testimony, the trial
judge refused to excuse the juror for
cause. Although the ensuing conviction
was reversed by the Florida Supreme
Court,' l 9 there is little encouragement in
the course of the opinion to suggest the
unlikelihood of such a situation recurring. Cases such as this one remind us
that the pretexts, morality and teleology
of law, mental health professions, and
the courts must, in the appropriate cases,
be viewed through the filter of the jury's
OCS as well.

The Futility of Legislative Reform
This conclusion leads us to consider
the role of the legislature: is it realistic
to look to legislative reform as a means
of ameliorating these situations? To answer this question, we must look more
narrowly at the issue of the development
of involuntary civil commitment law.
Although the 1970s were marked by
a significant tightening of involuntary
civil commitment standardsI2O (a trend
that has been subsequently reversed as
the "pendulum" has begun to swing in
the direction of rebroadened criteria),I2'
there is little evidence to suggest that
mental health professionals rigorously
adhered to the stricter legislative guidel i n e ~ . ' ~ 'Empirical evidence reveals,
rather, that they more likely simply substituted older, lack-of-insight based legislation in spite of the new laws to the
contrary. '23
Here, Drs. Bagby and ~ t k i n s o n l ~ ~
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have speculated that such professionals
exhibit "psychological reactance" in resisting legislative attempts to reduce
their prer0gati~e.l~~
Because of this resistance-frequently grounded in a misguided sense of "moral obligation"'26restrictive laws are ignored and some
psychiatrists continue to commit those
"whom they believe should be committed."'27 Similarly, it has been suggested
that broad statutory criteria "invite
[medical witnesses] to implement hidden agendas about treating the mentally
~~
ill and protecting s o ~ i e t y . " ' Phrased
differently, this phenomenon reflects
"cognitive dissonancem-the tendency
of individuals to reinterpret information
or experience that conflicts with their
internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid the unpleasant
state that such inconsistencies prod ~ c e .Just
' ~ ~as we can observe judicial
cognitive dissonance at play in insanity
defense cases (between judges' OCS and
what we now understand about mental
illness, its impact on criminal behavior,
and the empirical disposition of insanity
defense cases),I3O so we can observe
professional cognitive dissonance here.
In other words, in some instances
where mental health reform legislation
does not meet the paternalistic needs of
MHPs, the statutes are simply subverted. 1 3 ' Bagby and his colleagues'32
suggest that the "relative disregard of
mental health law" has a long local history, and that this problem raises "serious questions about the feasibility of
legislating the practice of mental health
professionals." Although I am not so
pessimistic, I suggest that these data are
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991

enormously important and deserve far
wider dissemination among all policy
makers in this area than it has received.

The Rest of the World
The outside world rarely shows any
interest in or recognition of this whole
bundle of issues until it is faced with the
statistically rare case of the false negative. Judge B a ~ e l o n has
' ~ ~ thus questioned why "run-of-the-mill muggings
by street toughs are too common for the
front pages, but even the most banal
burglary is newsworthy if committed by
someone with a psychiatric history."
Just as the vividness of media stories
about particularly violent criminal offenses has a "disproportionate impact"
on public perceptions about crime,134SO
does this publicity lead us to overattribute representativeness to the type of act
in question or to the idiosyncratic personality characteristics of the actor.135
Thus, public agitation and concomitant legislative "correction" is driven by
heuristic r e a ~ 0 n i n g . IA~ ~vivid, "outrageous" case that shows the public "what
happens" when someone "falls through
the cracks" animates legislative reform
to ensure that such errors not be repli~ a t e d . In
' ~ ~the state of Washington,
after an individual who had been denied
admission to a state hospital murdered
two elderly neighbors (leading to a significant-and
controversial-broadening of civil commitment standard^),'^^
commitments from the vicinage in question rose 100%even prior to the effective
date of legislative reform.139
Two other separate and seemingly un139
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related points offer further illumination.
There is now some significant evidence
that street police officers-in many instances, the true "institutional gatekeepers"-employ their OCS-ical concept of
mental illness (manifested as "disrepect,
recalcitrance and moral defect") and
shape their police reports through "dramatic communications" so as to "magnify the subjective madness and dangerousness of their subjects," and insure
their admission into forensic psychiatric
h0spita1s.l~~
Finally, at least one prominent forensic psychiatrist has recently
written that, even though the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence barring "ultimate opinion"
testimony'41were "scientifically" unnecessary, the new rule might still be justified because of the American Psychiatric
Association's "concern about the unfavorable public attitude towards psychiatric participation in controversial insanity c a s e ~ . " ' ~ ~
When added to the dominance of the
heuristic legislative style, these two additional reports have additional importance. First, they show that much of the
data upon which we base our assumptions, findings, and recommendations
are governed by a cadre of individuals
with absolutely no scientific or scholarly
grounding upon which to base their actions, but whose OCS is driven by a
discrete and important "moral" system
(perhaps not so much unlike the moral
psychiatrists Dr. Chodoff spoke of).'43
Second, they show the power of symbolism in forensic developments: notwithstanding behavioral or empirical merit,
it is seen as essential-as a public rela140

tions ploy-to the American Psychiatric
Association that it endorse a rule of little
scientific value so as to ward off political
and social criticism. Perhaps it is this
final piece of data that helps clarify the
extent of the dilemma we face.

Conclusion
We cannot coherently explain any of
the developments in question without
considering the impact of heuristic reasoning, the power of psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance, and
the dominance of OCS. We also need to
pay further heed to reports that heuristic
biases infect clinicians' reports as
Also, we can never underestimate the
role of what Professor Ernest Roberts'45
has, in another context, characterized as
"tensile strength":
[Elvery legal principle can only hold a certain
amount of emotional or political freight, and
that amount is defined as tensile strength.
When a principle is pushed beyond its tensile
strength by expansionist litigators or creative
legislators, it will simply fall apart.

If the parallel law of hydraulic
pressure146raises arousal to "dysfunctionally high levels," there is the danger
that innovation will be precluded because the "limits of bounded rationality
are e~ceeded."'~'I think it is necessary
for us to consider whether the lawlforensic mental health systems has yet
reached this pressure point, and, if it
has, whether it is in danger of becoming
dysfunctional. 14'
What, then, can we do? For a start,
we need to start thinking about rebuilding some of our professional infrastructures, a rebuilding that will require all to
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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redefine institutional and professional
roles, to reconsider the way that we privilege expertise, rethink the importance
of moral preferences, recalibrate the way
that the legal and behavioral communities share responsibility and blame as
well as "moral jurisdiction" over these
matters, and to consciously confront the
way that we employ "common sense" in
this arena and the way that our cognitive
simplifying devices distort the underlying social and political issues. If we can
do this, and if we can acknowledge the
way we act pretextually, decide cases
telologically, think heuristically, and superimpose improper systems of morality, we stand a chance of beginning to,
finally, pursue agreement'49between our
two systems.
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(West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (three to five
years): Fla. Stat. Ann. 55837.02 & 775.082.083 (West 1976). (up
. - to five years and
$5.000 fine).
4. See generally, 0. Will: Process. Psychotherapy and Schizophrenia (196 I), reprinted in
J. Katz. J. Goldstein. A. Dershowitz: Psvchoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law 68014
(1967); see also, M. Moore: Law and PsyBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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( 1984).

5. see-e.g., A. Benjamin: The Helping Interview 140-3 (1969); R. Langs: The Technique of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy
294-7 (2d ed. 1976): C. Rogers: Counseling
and Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts in
Practice 327 (1942); F. Perls, R. Hefferline,
P. Goodman: Gestalt Therapy 5 10-1 (2d
ed. 1973): R. Balsam, A. Balsam: The Book
of Family Therapy, Becoming a Psychotherapist: A Clinical Primer 108- 11 ( 1974).
6. A. Benjamin. supra note 5, at 92-5.
7. Green: The law-science interface in public
policy decisionmaking. 5 1 Ohio St L J 375405 (1990).
8. Some psychiatrists see this difference as critical in explaining what they perceive as
differences in the perspectives of the two
professions. See e g , Lamb: Involuntary
treatment for the homeless mentally ill, 4
Notre Dame J L Ethics Pub Pol'y 169. 276
(1989) (discussing Szasz, Goffman. and
Laing as intellectually animating sources for
"many attorneys"); M. Peszke: Involuntary
Treatment of the Mentally I11 133-6 (1975)
(law students' interest in law and psychiatry
comes from students' desires "to learn how
to punch holes and to show the psychiatrist
up in court").
9. See e.g., Cohen: The evolutionary relationship between psychiatry and law, in A.
Carmi, S. Schneider, A. Hefez: Psychiatry,
Law and Ethics 69 (1986); Bentley: The
infant and the dream: psychology and the
law, in D. Farrington, K. Hawkins. S.
Lloyd-Bostock. eds.. Psychology. Law and
Legal Processes 35 (1979).
10. See J. Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil:
The Origins of Madness. 67-110. (1975)
(relationship dates back to Roman law and
Justinian codes).
11. See J. Robitscher, Pursuit of Agreement:
Psychiatry and the Law 12 (1966), citing F.
Whitlock. Criminal Responsibility and
Mental Illness (1963). See generally, 1 M.
Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and
Criminal 51.01 (1989). at 2 n.2. Compare
Perlin and Sadoff. The Adversary System,
in S. Kutash et al. Violence: Perspectives
on Murder and Agression 394 (1978) ("the
intersection of law and mental health stands
at a significant focal point in the development of human behavior, at a point where
motives, intents, and drives can and must
be examined in the contexts of rights, obligations. duties. and the social order").
12. See infra text accompanying notes 22-56.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 57-78.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 79-104.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 105-19.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 120-32.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 133-42.
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On "false positives." see generally, Ennis,
Litwack: Psychiatry and the presumption of
expertise: flipping coins in the courtroom,
62 Calif L Rev 693, 734-5 (1974). On the
way that courts err by making too many
"false negative" judgments (being more
conservative than is clinically necessary),
see Boehnert: Characteristics of successful
and unsuccessful insanity pleas, 13 Law
Hum Behav 3 1, 38 (1989). On "moral mistakes," see Bonnie: Morality, equality, and
expertise: Renegotiating the relationship between psychiatry and law, 12 Bull Am Acad
Psychiatry Law 5, 17 (1984).
18. See Perlin: Psychodynamics and the insanity defense: 'ordinary common sense' and
heuristic reasoning, 69 Neb L Rev 3-70
(1990).
19. See generally, Perlin: Unpacking the myths:
the symbolism mythology of insanity defense jurisprudence, 40 Case W Res L Rev
599 (1989-90); compare Rappeport: Editorial: Is forensic psychiatry ethical? 12 Bull
Am Acad Psychiatry Law 205-7 (1984) (society's response to the Hinckley acquittal
"placed the blame on the insanity plea and
the psychiatrists"). It is necessary to acknowledge that there are at least two universes worthy of consideration in this context: the case such as Hinckley's that captures the attention of the whole nation, and
the vivid case that may be unknown nationally but in which local interest is so heavy
that its disposition may overwhelm a statewide legal system. See, e.g., Fischer, Pierce,
Appelbaum: How flexible are our civil commitment statutes? 39 Hosp Community
Psychiatry 71 1 (1978) (commitment rates
in one Washington county increased 100%
following murder by mentally disabled individual who had been denied voluntary
admission to psychiatric hospital).
20. But see D. Wexler: Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent
(1990) (critically investigating the impact of
legal rules on the functioning of the mental
health system); compare Gutheil, Burstajn,
Kaplan, Brodsky: Participation in competency assessment and treatment decisions:
the role of a psychiatrist-attorney team, 1 1
Ment Phys Disabil L Rep 446, 449 (1987)
(discussing "critogenesis"-the
"intrinsic
risks of legal intervention" in medical decision making).
2 1. See generally, J. Robitscher, supra note I I .
22. It may also be confusing. Dr. Robert L.
Sadoff has suggested that I need to deconstruct the phrase to assess the difference
between pre-text (i.e., attitudes prece4e
written decisions), and pretext (i.e., a legal
fiction). Prof. Richard Sherwin has asked
whether it may also mean "not yet ready
for text." As with most deconstructive read-

ings-see e.g., Balkin: Deconstructive practice and legal theory, 96 Yale L J 743
(1987)-I am willing to grant that all these
interpretations are equally plausible. On the
other hand. the law pays dogged lip service
to the principle that "mere pretext" must be
ferreted out in the legal decision making
process. A WESTLAW@search conducted
on November 24, 1990. revealed 474 state
cases and 1,30 1 federal cases in which the
phrase "mere pretext" has appeared. See
e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.. 485 U.S. 7 17. 752 (1988)
(antitrust); City of Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 479 U.S. 462, 470 (1987) (voting
rights act): Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
888 (1983) (1983) (death penalty): Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-7 n. 12 (1983)
(pregnancy discrimination). Other aspects
of Barefoot are discussed infra text accompanying notes 98-9.
23. On the related question of the judicial reading of "laws that are applicable and constitutional but uncommonly silly." see Smith:
Why should courts obey the law? 77 Geo L
J 113, 125-6 (1988).
24. See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in
criminal prosecutions under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
25. See Alschuler: "Close enough for government work": the exclusionary rule after
Leon, 1984 Sup Ct Rev 309. 349 n. 117,
citing, inter aha, Cohen: Police pejury: an
interview with Martin Garbus, 8 Crim L
Bull 363, 365 (1972) (defense counsel who
appeared in about 150 drug cases over a 13year period "had no doubt that the police
had 'shaped' their testimony in every case")
(emphasis added): Sevilla: The exclusionary
rule and police pejury, 1 1 San Diego L Rev
839 ( 1974): Grano: A dilemma for defense
counsel: Spinelli-Harris search warrants
and the possibility of police perjury. 1971
U I11 L F 405,408-9. See also United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 950-1 (1983) (Brennan, J. dissenting), citing Nardulli: The societal cost of the exclusionary rule: an empirical assessment, 1983 Am B Found Res
J 585, 596 (only 0.6% of all suppression
motions successful); Report of the Comptroller General of the U.S.. Impact of the
Exclusionary Rule and Federal Criminal
Prosecutions 8, 10 (1979) (0.7% success
rate). On the related topic of pretextual
arrests, see e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977): New York v Class,
475 U.S. 106 (1986). The issue is discussed
in M a c h , Seeing the constitution from the
backseat of a police squad car. 70 B U L
Rev 543-4 (1990) (review of H. R. Uviller,
Tempered Zeal (1988)), and in Note, CrimBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991
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inal law-pretextual arrests and alternatives
to the objective test, 12 West N Engl L Rev
105 ( 1990).
26. ~ a y ' v~. o o ~ e r m a780
n , F. 2d 240,241 (3d
Cir. 1985), appeal dismissed sub. nom.
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 1 (1987).
27. Worden. Worden: Local politics and the
provision of indigent defense counsel, 1 I L
Pol'y 401 (1989). Provision of counsel is
mandated in Gideon v. Wainwrieht. 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and ~ r ~ e r s i nv.ha'mlin,
~er
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
28. See generally. Conference, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does the Rieht to
c o b e l Guarantee Today? 10 Pace Rev
327 (1990). and especially id. at 341 (the
legal system functions as if Gideon had
never been decided") (remarks of Prof. Burt
Neuborne), and id. at p. 333 (trial of death
penalty cases provide example of "Gideon
betrayed) (remarks of Prof. Michael Mushlin). See also id. at 343-78 (remarks of Prof.
Yale Kamisar), and at 387-406 (remarks of
Paula ~ e u t s c het al).
29. Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343
(D.D.C. 1987). This sort of vretext is not
limited to mental health cases. Compare
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 n. 14
(1972) (notwithstanding presence of recovery provision in state prejudgment replevin
statute, not a single defendant in a sample
of 442 cases studied invoked that procedure). The nonavailers in Streicher and in
Fuentes, of course, were indigent, and generally without access to the judicial system.
30. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S.
Ct. 1981, 1984-85 (1989): see generally,
Costello: Average voting members and
other "benign fictions"; the relative reliability of committee reports, floor debates. and
other sources of legislative history. 1990
Duke L J 39. In its most recent term, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged its use of
"legal fictions" on at least three occasions
involving different areas of the law; see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,
1 10 S. Ct. 284 1 (1990) (right to die); United
States v. Dalm, 1 10 S. Ct. 136 1 (1990) (gift
tax refund recoupment process); Carden v.
Arkoma Associates, 1 10 S. Ct. 10 15 (1990)
(determining partnership residency in diversity jurisdiction case).
3 1. McCleskey v. Kemp. 48 1 U.S. 279 (1987).
32. Id. at 3 13. On the empirical contribution of
social science to the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, see Acker: Social science in Supreme Court criminal
cases and briefs: the actual and potential
contribution of social scientists as amici
curiae, 14 L Hum Behav 25 (1990); Acker:
Thirty years of social science in Supreme
Court criminal cases, 12 L Pol'y 1 (1990);
see also Tremper: Organized psychology's
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991

33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

38.

efforts to influence judicial policy-making,
42 Am Psychologist 496 (1987). On the role
of social science in the type of inquiry regularly pursued in such litigation. see Rossow, Rossow: Student initiated religious activity: constitutional argument or psychological inquiry, 19 J L Educ 207 (1990).
McCleskey. 48 1 U.S. at 292 (emphasis was
included in text).
Perlin, supra note 19, at 7 13-2 1. On malingering, see e g , Rogers, Delmetsch. Cavanaugh: Assessment and conceptualization of competency to stand trial, 9 L Hum
Behav 32 1 (1984); Rogers, Delmetsch. Cavanaugh: An empirical approach to insanity
evaluations, 37 J Clin Psychol 683 (1981).
For more recent work. see Rogers, Gillis,
Bagby: The SIRS as a measure of malingering: a validation study with a correctional
sample, 8 Behav Sci L 85 (1990); Rogers,
Bagby, Rector: Diagnostic legitimacy of factitious disorder with psychological symptoms, 146 Am J Psychiatry 312 (1989): R.
Rogers: Models of feigned mental illness
(manuscript); R. Rogers et al: Standardized
assessment of malingering: validation of the
structured interview of reported symptoms
(manuscript).
See e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US. 399,
43 1 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): see
generally, Perlin, supra note 19, at 725-26.
Sherwin: Dialects and dominance: a study
of rhetorical fields in the law of confessions,
136 U Pa L Rev 729 (1988).
Compare Barton: Behind the legal explosion, 27 Stan L Rev 567 (1975). and Manning: Hyperlexis: our national disease. 71
NW U L Rev 767 (1977) (setting out
myths), to Galanter: Reading the landscape
of disputes: What we know (and think we
know) about our allegedly contentious and
litigious society, 31 (UCLA L Rev 4, 38-9
(1983), and Felstiner. Abel. Sarat: The
emergence and transformation of disputes:
naming. blaming. claiming. . ., 15 L Soc'y
Rev 631 (198 1) (setting out reality). On the
specific question of frequency of tort litigation in the mental health context, see Bonnie: Professional liability and the quality of
mental health care, 16 L Med Health Care
229 (1988); M. Perlin: Power imbalances in
the therapeutic and forensic relationship
(paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Psychiatry Conference on Law and Ethics, November 1990).
manuscript at 25-8.
Compare Kaplan: Courtroom indignities,
Cal Lawyer (Aug. 1985). 72: Lees-Haley,
Personal injury malingering, For the Defense (Feb. 1986), 28 (myths), to J. Fleming:
The American Tort Process 140-5 (1988);
Kramer: The Harvard Study, an analysis,"
NYLJ (Mar. 7, 1990), at 1: Gellis: Legisla143
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tive reforms of governmental tort liability:
overreacting to minimal evidence, 2 1 Rutgers L J 375 (1990) (reality).
39. Compare Brakel: Prison reform litigation:
has the revolution gone too far? 49 Correction Today 160 (1 987) (myths), to Thomas:
The "reality" of prisoner litigation: repackaging the data, 15 N Eng J Crim Civ Confinement 4 1. 42-4 ( 1989) (reality).
40. Mickenberg: A pleasant surprise: the guilty
but mentally ill verdict has succeeded on its
own right and successfully preserved the
traditional role of the insanity defense, 55
U Cin L Rev 943, 980 (1987), quoting
Roberts: High U.S. officials express outrage,
asking for new law on insanity plea, NY
Times. (June 23, 1981), at B6, col. 1. See
also, Keilitz: Researching and reforming the
insanity call for abolition of the insanity
defense, 39 Rutgers L Rev 289, 306 n. 97
(1987) (discussing Heritage Foundation's
call for abolition of the insanity defense as
a "priority in the criminal justice field in
1987"). Compare Smith: Limiting the insanity defense: a rational approach to irrational crime, 47 Mo L Rev 605,610 (1982)
(insanity defense invoked "for the purpose
of avoiding punishment"), with Perlin, supra note 19, at 65 1 (insanity acquittees
spend almost double the amount of time
incarcerated in maximum security settings
that defendants convicted of similar crimes
spend in prison settings).
4 1. Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 1 1 1 F.R.D. 91,225 (1985) (remarks of
Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General).
42. See generally Perlin, supra note 19, at 6406.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
44. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46. See e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
29 1, 304 (1980) (Burger. C. J., concurring)
("The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices
have adjusted to its strictures: I would neither overrule Miranda. disparage it, nor
extend it, at this late date").
47. O'Connor v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 563
( 1 975).
48. Jackson v. Indiana. 406 U.S. 7 15 (1972).
49. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent citations
omitted); see generally, 1 M. Perlin, supra
note 1 1, at gg2.09. 2.1 I .
50. The author was, for eight years. Director of
the Division of Mental Health Advocacy in
the New Jersey Department of the Public
Advocate, and a member of that state's
Supreme Court Committee on Civil Commitments. The thought in question was ex-

pressed on literally dozens of occasions by
both judges and administrative personnel.
5 1. Perlin. suma note 19. at 648-55.
52. Id. at 653155.
53. For a flavor of the individual cases. see 1
M. Perlin. suDra note 11. at 63.45.
54. See e.g., ~ r a & o i sv. ~ e n d e r s o n 850
, F. 2d
23 1 (5th Cir. 1988), and cases discussed in
Perlin. supra note 19, at 7 13-3 1: Breunig v.
Amer. Family Insurance, 45 Wis. 2d 536,
173 N.W. 2d 619 (1970).
55. United States v. Still. 857 F. 2d 671, 672
(9th Cir. 1988).
56. Id.
57. On the many hats worn by the testifying
mental health professional expert witness,
see Smith: Mental health expert witnesses:
of science and crystal balls, 7 Behav Sci L
145. 15 1-7 (1 989) (teacher, priest, wizard.
magician, decision maker, scapegoat, advocate, adviser, and smokescreen): see also,
Wasyliw, Cavanaugh. Rogers: Beyond the
scientific limits of expert testimony. 13 Bull
Am Acad Psychiatry Law 147, 153-6
(1985).
58. Diamond, The fallacy of the impartial expert, 3 Arch Crim Psychodynam 221, 222
(1959). as quoted in Goldstein: Hiring the
hired guns: lawyers and their psychiatric
experts, 1 1 Leg Stud Foruin 41 (1987). On
the potential role of psychiatric bias in the
penalty phase of capital punishment trials,
see Smith v. Estelle, 602 F. 2d 694,708 (5th
Cir. 1979), affd 451 U.S. 454. 471 (1981).
On the way that the problem of "dual allegiances" can affect governmentally employed psychiatrists. see United States v.
Byers. 740 F. 2d 1104, 1138, 1152-3 (1984)
(Bazelon, S. J.. dissenting): see generally. M.
Perlin, supra note 37. manuscript at 11-2,
discussing, inter aha. Shestack: Psychiatry
and the dilemmas of dual loyalties. 60 ABA
J 1521 (1974): Halleck: The ethical dilemmas of forensic psychiatry: a utilitarian approach, 12 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law
279 (1984).
59. See e.g., Homant. Kennedy: Judgment of
legal insanity as a function of attitude toward the insanity defense, 8 Int'l J L Psychiatry 67 (1986): Homant. Kennedy: Subjective factors in the judgment of insanity,
14 Crim Just Behav 38 (1987); Homant,
Kennedy: Definitions of mental illness as a
factor in expert witnesses: judgments of insanity, 31 Corrective and Soc'l Psych J Behavior Tech Methods and Ther 125 (1 985).
The universality of the conclusions that can
be drawn from this research is gently questioned in Rogers. Ewing: Ultimate opinion
proscriptions: a cosmetic fix and a plea for
empiricism, 13 Law Hum Behav 357. 369
(1989): see also. Rogers, Bagby, Crouch,
Cutler: Effects of ultimate opinions on juror
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60.
6 1.

62.

63.

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

7 1.

72.

perceptions of insanity. 13 Int'l J L Psychiatry 225 (1990).
B. Bursten: Beyond Psychiatric Expertise
I67 (1984).
Davis: ~ a wscience.
.
and history: reflections
upon in the best interests of the child, 86
Mich L Rev 1096. 1107 (1988). citing S.
Gould: The Mismeasure of Man 21-2
(1981) (book review of J. Goldstein. A. Solnit. S. Goldstein: In the Best Interests of
The Child (1986)).
Zusman. Simon: Differences in repeated
psychiatric examinations of litigants to a
lawsuit, 140 Am J Psychiatry 1300, 1302-4
(1983) (interview setting. training, orientation. and identification with one side all
helped shape forensic evaluations). On the
influence of such variables as "physical attractiveness. interpersonal adeptness. and
social likeability" on the related question of
degree of punitiveness exhibited toward defendants in sentencing decisions, see Rogers: Ethical dilemmas in forensic evaluations, 5 Behav Sci L 149, 152 (1987). discussing findings reported in M. Saks, R.
Hastie, Social Psychology in Court (1978).
Rogers et al: Forensic psychiatrists' and psychologists' understanding of insanity: Misguided expertise, 33 Can J Psychiatry 69 1
(1988).
See 1 M. Perlin, supra note 1 1 . at $92.092.11.
Recent research shows that. in one carefully
controlled study. clinicians did conform to
the controlling involuntary civil commitment law. See Lidz et al.: The consistency
of clinicians and the use of legal standards,
146 Am J Psychiatry 176 (1989).
See Reich: Psychiatric diagnosis as an ethical problem, in S. Bloch, P. Chodoff. eds.:
Psychiatric Ethics 72 (198 1).
Chodofi The case for involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill, 133 Am J Psychiatry 496. 50 1 ( 1976).
McGarry. Chodoff: The ethics of involuntary hospitalization, in Bloch & Chodoff,
eds.. supra note 66, at 203, 2 1 1, 2 12.
Chodoff, Involuntary hospitalization of the
mentally ill as a moral issue, 141 Am J
Psychiatry 384. 388 (1984).
Lamb. supra note 8. at 277. On the impact
of these attitudes in the development of our
social policies involving homeless mentally
ill individuals, see generally, Perlin: Competency, deinstitutionalization, and homelessness: a story of marginalization, 28 Hous
L Rev 63 (1991).
McCormick: Involuntary commitment in
Ontario: some barriers to the provision of
proper care, 124 Can Med Ass'n J 7 15, 7 17
(1981).
See Kahle, Sales, Nagel: On unicorns blocking commitment law reform, 6 J Psychiatry
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73.

74.

75.

76.
77.

78.

L 89 (1978). as cited in Hiday: Sociology of
mental health law. 67 Sociol Soc Res 1 1 1 ,
120-1 (1983).
It would appear as if this position almost
attempts to suggest the appropriateness of a
duress or necessity doctrine to be employed
in such cases. In standard tort law. such a
defense typically applies when one commits
what would otherwise be tortious behavior
to save another's life in the face of a violent
storm or other "act of God." See e.g.. Ploof
v. Putnam. 8 1 Vt. 47 1, 7 1 A. 188 (1908);
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation, 109
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (19 10). This situation is fairly far removed from the more
parallel use of the necessity defense in criminal cases where one acts to avoid a perceived political or social harm. See e g .
State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22. 410 A. 2d
1000 (1979) (protest at nuclear power
plant); Sigma Reproductive Health Center
v. State. 297 Md. 660. 467 A. 2d 483 (1983)
(abortion clinic trespass case). Perhaps a
closer tort law analogy can be found in the
false imprisonment. religious deprogramming cases. See e g . Peterson v. Sorlien,
299 N.W. 2d 123 (Minn. 1980).
Legal scholars are beginning to critically
investigate the question of how seriously (if
at all) legal rules impair the functioning of
the mental health system. See e.g., Schopp.
Wexler: Shooting yourself in the foot with
due care. 17 J Psychiatry L 163 (1989): D.
Wexler, supra note 20. For a recent review
of the relevant literature, see D. Wexler:
Putting mental health into mental health
law: therapeutic jurisprudence (paper delivered at the National Symposium on Justice
and Mental Health System Interactions.
November 1990). manuscript at nn. 40-64;
Winick: Competency to consent to treatment: the distinction between assent and
objection, 28 Hous L Rev 15 (199 1).
See e.g., Bagby: The effects of legislative
reform on admission rates to psychiatric
units of general hospitals, 10 Int'l J L Psychiatry 383 (1987). As to what Dr. Richard
Rogers and his associates refer to as an
"arrogation of power," see Rogers et al.,
supra note 63, at 694.
Saks: Expert witnesses, nonexpert witnesses,
and nonwitness experts. 14 L Hum Behav
29 I . 294 (1990). and id. n. 2.
Compare Matter of Eaton, 48 Wash. App.
806, 740 P. 2d 907, 91 1-2 (1987) (rejecting
argument of state social service department
that only it, and not the court. is in the best
position to make juvenile institutional
placement decisions).
See Saks. supra note 76, at 299 (reporting
on an interview with a state prosecutor who
said that he preferred using local forensic
science experts rather than experts from the
145
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FBI's crime laboratory, because "it was
harder to get the FBI experts to say what
you want them to").
79. See Rogers. Webster: Assessing treatability
in mentally disordered offenders. 13 L Hum
Behav 19, 2 1 (1989).
80. Of this basic teleology, I now have no
doubts. See Perlin, supra note 18. at 53-6 1.
8 1. See e.g., Monahan. Walker: Social authority: obtaining. evaluating. and establishing
social science in law. 134 U Pa L Rev 477
(1986); Walker. Monahan: Social facts: scientific methodology as legal precedent, 76
Calif L Rev 877 (1988). For an earlier optimistic view. see Levine. Howe: The penetration of social science into legal culture, 7
L Pol'y 173 (1985).
82. See Tanford & Tanford, Better trials
through science: a defense of psychologistlawyer collaboration. 66 N C L Rev 741.
742-6 (1988).
83. See e.g.. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223.
246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (smaller
than six-person jury unconstitutional in
state criminal trials) (challenging the "wisdom-as well as the necessity-of. . . heavy
reliance on nzimerology derived from statistical studies") (emphasis added).
84. Sperlich: Trial by jury: it may have a future,
in Supreme Court Review 19 1.208 (P. Kurland & G. Casper. eds.. 1978): Grofman:
The slippery slope: jury size and jury verdict
requirements-legal and social science approaches, 2 L Pol'y Q 285. 300 (1980). See
also Suggs: The use of psychological research by the judiciary. 3 L Hum Behav
135, 147 (1979) (courts have failed to develop methods to insure validity of research
used in opinions).
85. Kerr: Social science and the U.S. Supreme
Court, in The Impact of Social Psychology
on Procedural Justice 56, 71 (M. Kaplan,
ed., 1986). Compare Tremper. supra note
32: Melton: Bringing psychology to the legal
system: opportunities, obstacles. and efficacy, 42 Am Psychologist 488 (1987), and
sources cited supra notes 32 & 84, and infra
note 90.
86. Woolhandler, Rethinking the judicial reception of legislative facts, 41 Vand L Rev
1 I 1. 125 n. 84 (1988). quoting D. Horowitz:
The Courts and Social Policy 284 (1977).
87. Rubin: The practice and discourse of legal
scholarship, 86 Mich L Rev 1835, 1989
(1988).
88. Compare McCleskey v. Kemp. 481 U.S.
279. 286-9 (1987), to Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102, 107 (1987). While the evidence in
question was not the critical factor in shaping the court's opinion in Asahi, nothing in
the opinion even hints at the methodological problems raised by the court's accept-

ance of this characterization of the evidence
by counsel.
89. See Ballew. 435 U.S. at 246, discussed supra
note 83: A ~ ~ e l b a u m
The
: em~iricaliurisprudence df' the United ~ t a t k s~up"reme
Court. 13 Am J L Med 335. 341 (1987):
Perlin. The Supreme Court, the mentally
disabled criminal defendant, and symbolic
values: random decisions, hidden rationales. or "doctrinal abyss"? 29 Ariz L Rev 1.
71 (1987).
90. ~ e h supra
,
note 85, at 58. See generally,
Melton: Developmental psychology and the
law: the state of the art. 22 J Fam L 445
(1983-4): Hafemeister, Melton: The impact
of social science research on the judiciary.
in Reforming the Law: Impact of Child
Development Research 27 (G. Melton. ed..
1987) (Reforming): Melton: Judicial notice
of "facts" about child development, in Reforming, supra. at 232: Weithorn: Professional responsibility in the dissemination of
psychological research in legal contexts, in
Reforming. supra, at 256; Loh: The evidence and trial procedure: the law, social
policy and psychological research, in The
Psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure 13 (S. Kassin, C. Wrightsman. eds.,
1985) (Trial); Sperlich: The evidence on
evidence: science and law in conflict and
cooperation. in Trial, supra at 325: Sarat:
Judicial capacity: courts. court reform, and
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